Abstract-Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks (WMSNs) produce enormous amounts of big multimedia data. Due to large size, Multimedia Sensor Nodes (MSNs) cannot store generated multimedia data for a long time. In this scenario, mobile sinks can be utilized for data collection. However, due to vulnerable nature of wireless networks, there is a need for an efficient security scheme to authenticate both MSNs and mobile sinks. In this paper, we propose a scheme to protect an underlying WMSN during mobile multimedia data collection. The proposed scheme is a two-layer scheme. At the first layer, all MSNs are distributed into small clusters, where each cluster is represented by a single Cluster Head (CH). At the second layer, all CHs verify identities of mobile sinks before sharing multimedia data. Authentication at both layers ensures a secure data exchange. We evaluate the performance of proposed scheme through extensive simulation results. The simulation results prove that the proposed scheme performs better as compared to existing state-of-the-art approaches in terms of resilience and handshake duration. The proposed scheme is also analyzed in terms of authentication rate, data freshness, and packet delivery ratio, and has shown a better performance.
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INTRODUCTION
T RADITIONAL concept of the Internet of Things (IoT) consists of small battery-operated sensing devices that are unable to perform long-range wireless communication [1] . These sensing devices usually form a small Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), and forward sensed data to a nearby Base Station (BS). In WSNs, computationally-complex tasks are always performed at BS. In recent years, evolutionary steps have been taken in the field of WSNs where audio and visual sensors are integrated into simple sensor nodes and transformed them into Multimedia Sensor Nodes (MSNs). These nodes are able to store, correlate and fuse both multimedia and non-multimedia data [2] . The MSNs are gaining the attention of researchers across the globe due to their wide range of applications in daily lives, such as e-health, transport management system, and surveillance systems. For example, in smart cities, smart cameras installed at major junctions, roads and highways can capture current situation of vehicular traffic, and forward captured multimedia data to either local or remote cloud servers for further processing and analysis. Earlier generations of MSNs consist of a limited battery power and a low-power transceiver to transmit and receive multimedia data. However, latest generations, such as wireless and camera motes, have powerful hardware and are able to deal with high-resolution multimedia data. A comparison between earlier and latest generations of MSNs was summarized in [3] . On a large scale, multiple smart sensing cameras operate simultaneously. As a result, huge volumes of multimedia data are generated, that need to be managed and processed efficiently in real-time.
Just like miniature sensors, the MSNs also build a network known as a Wireless Multimedia Sensor Network (WMSN). For an efficient data sharing and transmission, the WSNs/WMSNs are usually distributed in small clusters. Each cluster is represented by a nominated node, known as a Cluster Head (CH). The nominated CHs take responsibility for collecting sensed/captured data from member nodes and forwarding to the BS. Depending upon the application, the captured data may contain sensitive information. Furthermore, there is usually no human intervention when WMSNs are deployed in open environments. Such deployments expose these networks to various network vulnerabilities and threats, such as node replication, Sybil attack, Denial-of-Service (DoS), and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks [4] . These attacks are usually launched by malicious nodes. Therefore, there is a need to protect these networks from vulnerabilities and threats through robust and highly efficient node authentication schemes.
For MWSNs operating in open environments, a mobile sink can play an important role to collect and forward data to local/cloud servers. The mobile sinks can be mobile sensors, smartphones or personal digital assistants, and are able to communicate with nearby sensor nodes [5] .
Therefore, the mobile sinks can be considered as an essential component in large-scale WMSNs. Sometimes, it is possible that the link between the cloud/local servers and BS may be partially or completely damaged. As a result, the BS is able to control the network but unable to upload collected data to servers. On the other hand, the CHs continuously collect and forward multimedia data to the BS. This data need to be offloaded by the BS due to the fact that the BS might not have enough storage space to store the forwarded real-time multimedia data for a long time. One solution to this problem is the use of mobile sinks. In this case, the CHs forward collected data to mobile sinks instead of forwarding to the BS. After receiving the data from CHs, the mobile sinks forward data to local/cloud servers as soon as they get access to the Internet. However, use of mobile sinks to collect data from WMSNs introduces a new security challenge in the forms of network control and attack. Privileges assigned to mobile sinks can be compromised, and as a result, can be misused. Without a proper authorization, compromised mobile sinks can control an entire network and may cause undesirable consequences. Therefore, there is a need for a proper security mechanism to authenticate the validity of mobile sinks and detect any compromised mobile sinks.
In this paper, we propose a secure multimedia data collection scheme using mobile sinks in WMSNs. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing solution for a secure mobile data collection in WMSNs. The proposed approach is based on a two-layer architecture. These two layers help in securely managing the captured multimedia data. At the first layer, identities of participating devices, i.e., the CHs and MSNs, are verified through a lightweight four-way handshaking mechanism. At the second layer, the CHs share the received data with authorized mobile sinks. The major contributions are as follows.
A lightweight four-way handshaking mechanism is applied to verify identities of participating devices (i.e., the CHs and MSNs). It is a payload-based mutual authentication mechanism. During the authentication process, the payload of a data packet is always encrypted, and the authentication mechanism incurs minimal computational overhead. A lightweight authentication scheme is applied to verify identities of mobile sinks. This scheme is similar to the four-way handshaking mechanism. However, due to the mobility of sinks, hashing functions along with random numbers are utilized to verify the identities of mobile sinks. This authentication is first performed between the mobile sinks and BS, and then between the mobile sinks and CHs. The performance of our proposed scheme is analyzed in terms of various performance metrics. The simulation results prove the efficiency of our proposed scheme as compared to other well-known state-of-the-art approaches. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. A literature review on recent work is provided in Section 2. The system model is described in Section 3 followed by an explanation of our proposed approach in Section 4. Experimental setup and simulation results are discussed in Section 5. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.
LITERATURE REVIEW
We distribute this section into two sections. In the first section, we discuss various node authentication schemes proposed for cluster-based WSNs/WMSNs. In the second sections, we provide an overview of various authentication schemes for mobile sinks.
Node Authentication
In [6] , various user authentication schemes designed for WSNs were reviewed. In this survey, the WSNs in unattended environments are targeted, and secure and dependable user authentication mechanisms are analyzed for future research proposals, challenges, and applications. In [7] , a study on an adaptive security design for malicious node detection in cluster-based sensor networks was presented. In this study, adaptive security modules are analyzed to improve a secure communication in cluster-based WSNs by protecting them from external malicious nodes using various authentication schemes.
In [8] , a cluster-based node authentication scheme was proposed for WMSNs. In this scheme, clusters are formed using a lightweight mutual authentication mechanism between MSNs and CHs. In [9] , a geographic secured routing mechanism was used to authenticate nodes and messages in WMSNs. In this mechanism, a Secure Hash Algorithm v3 (SHA-3) is used to minimize computational complexity for authentication purposes. In [10] , a user-friendly hybrid authentication scheme was proposed for WSNs. In this scheme, mutual authentication and key agreement schemes are combined using chaotic maps to minimize computational complexity and protect user anonymity and secret passwords. In [11] , a compressive sensing based approach for a secure data collection in WSNs was proposed. In this approach, asymmetric semi-homomorphic encryption is used to ensure the privacy during data collection, and a sparse compressive matrix is used to reduce computational costs.
Mobile Sink Authentication
In [12] , an authentication scheme was proposed to detect mobile sink replication attacks in unattended sensor networks. This scheme is based on a model where a mobile sink can collect data from a sensor node only if it establishes a shared key with the sensor node and passes through authentication of at least m neighbors to improve underlying network's resilience against replication attacks. In [13] , [14] , a seamless key agreement framework was proposed for mobile sinks in an IoT-based cloud-centric secured sensor network. In this framework, a seamless secured authentication and key agreement approach using bilinear pairing and elliptic-curve crypto-systems is adopted to prevent node-capture attacks and support data confidentiality, mutual authentication, session-key agreement, user anonymity, password guessing, and key impersonation. In [15] , a comprehensive approach for data collection was proposed for sensor-cloud systems. In this approach, the trustworthiness of mobile sinks and sensor nodes are evaluated against various type of trusts. In [16] , a pairing-free ID-based identification scheme was proposed to minimize computation and communication costs for registering mobile sinks in WSNs. In this scheme, the performance is evaluated in terms of computation cost and energy consumption on wellknown WSN hardware platforms. In [17] , distributed and decentralized schemes were proposed to detect replication attacks in mobile WSNs. In these schemes, malicious nodes along with collaborating imposters are detected and quarantined through the total number of false-positives. In [18] , a lightweight algorithm was proposed to detect mobile Sybil nodes in mobile WSNs. In this algorithm, a Watchdog Nodes first technique is used to label mobile nodes based on their movements. As a result, the Sybil nodes can be detected with a high accuracy according to their movements and assigned labels.
SYSTEM MODEL
The system model focuses on multimedia data collection from secured WMSNs. Multimedia sensor nodes capture unusual events and store the captured data in buffers. Later, the captured data are forwarded to elected CHs. After authenticating, the CHs share the data with nearby mobile sinks. The mobile sinks are responsible to upload the data to cloud servers via the Internet. As the focus is on a secure collection of multimedia data, therefore, computational overhead of securing an underlying network needs to be the minimum.
Secure Cluster Formation Model
The secure cluster formation model is based on our previous work published in [19] , [20] . Notations used in our proposed model are summarized in Table 1 . In this model, an MSN, a CH, and a BS are denoted by an a, r, g, respectively. Identity verification messages are exchanged between as and rs. The identity verification messages contain various challenges that need to be decrypted by communicating entities. In our proposed scheme, an authentication process consists of four phases, i.e., session initiation, CH challenge, MSN response and challenge, and CH response. To encrypt the payload of verification messages, Advanced Encryption Standard 128-bits (AES-128) is used. Each MSN possesses a pre-shared secret (i.e., ) and a token (i.e., t). The secret is used during an authentication process, and the token is used for a secure exchange of nomination and acknowledgment packets between the CHs and BS.
During the first phase, i.e., the session initiation, each MSN creates a joining-request message and forwards it to a targeted CH. Payload of each joining-request message contains ID of the MSN (i.e., a i ), where i 2 f1; 2; 3; . . . ; Ig, and header contains ID of the targeted CH (i.e., r j ), where j 2 f1; 2; 3; . . . ; Jg).
After the session initiation, next phase is the CH challenge. In this phase, the targeted r j searches for a matching i for a corresponding a i , and replies back with a challenge. The challenge consists of a pseudo-random nonce (i.e., h r ), and a session key (i.e., m) generated by the targeted r j . The challenge is created using the following equations.
(1)
where # is an intermediate value and C r is a challenge created by the targeted r j for requesting a i . In the MSN response and challenge phase, the requesting a i retrieves an h r and a m from C r , and creates a challenge of its own for the targeted r j using the following equations.
where h i is a pseudo-random nonce, # is an intermediate value, and C i is a challenge created by a requesting a i for a targeted r j . Upon reception of C i , the targeted r j tries to retrieve an h r from an a i 's challenge. If present, the status of requesting a i changes to Authenticated, and a response in the form of a challenge is sent to the requesting a i to complete the authentication process using the following equation.
Upon receiving the challenge computed by Eq. (5), the a i tries to extract an h i . If present, the status of r j changes to Authenticated.
Mobile Sink Verification Model
Notations used in this model are summarized in Table 2 . Mobile sinks (i.e., bs) communicate with CHs to collect the captured data. However, each mobile sink first needs to register itself with a BS. Once registered, the mobile sinks are able to communicate with surrounding CHs. Before contacting the BS for registration, each mobile sink generates a session key (i.e., m k ), where k represents ID of requesting mobile sink and k 2 f1; 2; 3; . . . ; Kg, and a random integer x where x 2 Z. In this registration process, two hashing functions, i.e., H 1 and H 2 , are utilized. Each b k generates a secure request message (i.e., Q k ) for registration using the following equation.
The generated request is forwarded to the BS. After receiving the request message, the BS generates an encrypted challenge (i.e., C g ) consisting of four values using the following equations, and forwards it to the requesting b k .
where w 2 Z, y 2 Z, D k represents a registration certificate, d k is a time-stamp, and C k is an authentication value for the requesting b k .
Upon receiving the encrypted challenge, each b k creates an encrypted response (i.e., C k ) using a random value z, where z 2 Z and an intermediate value a k , and replies back to complete the registration process by using the following equations.
Upon receiving a response from a b k , the BS verifies identity of the responding b k using Eq. (8a). If the equation holds, then the b k is considered an authentic node. The b k generates an encrypted connection request (i.e., C k ) including a new session key (i.e., m k ) by using the following equations, and forwards it to an authentic r j .
where fðÞ is a bilinear group mapping function. Upon receiving the request, an r j verifies the identity of b k by using Eq. (9a). If the equation holds, the b k is considered an authentic node. Once authenticated, the r j can start communication with b k using m k . Each b k has a specific capacity, and cannot collect multimedia data from all nearby rs. It is possible that a b k is communicating with more than one r at a time. In this situation, it needs to assign a specific capacity to each r j . The available capacity (i.e.,ĉ) of a b k at time t is estimated by the following equations.
where, d represents the communication range, v is the moving speed, and s is the service rate of a b k .
SECURED AND AUTHORIZED DATA COLLECTION SCHEME
In this section, we explain our proposed Secured and authorized Scheme (SaaS) for mobile multimedia data collection. A block diagram depicting the traditional mechanism of WMSNs is shown in Fig. 1 . A block diagram depicting the operational mechanism of our proposed SaaS is shown in Fig. 2 . Our proposed SaaS is divided in two layers, i.e., device and mobile sink layers. Clusters are formed at the device layer using a lightweight handshaking mechanism while data is collected from CHs through mobile sinks at the mobile sink layer.
Secure Cluster Formation
This phase is divided in two sub-phases, i.e., an election of CHs and a mutual authentication between MSNs and CHs.
The CH election is a token-based approach which enables MSNs with highest energy levels to become the CHs. Remaining nodes join CHs to form clusters and forward data to the elected CHs.
CH Election
In our proposed SaaS, a WMSN consists of 500 randomly deployed MSNs. The MSNs with minimum energy levels become members in a cluster while remaining nodes become CHs. The elected CHs are responsible for authentication of member nodes and receiving and forwarding of data to a BS. Each MSN possesses a and a t. The t is used to exchange control packets i.e., nomination packets (i.e., p) and acknowledgment packets (i.e., ACK), between the CHs and BS. On the other hand, the is used to perform mutual authentication inside clusters between the MSNs and CHs. In the beginning of each simulation round, each a i sends a p i to BS. Each p i contains a's ID (i.e., i), secret (i.e., i ), and residual energy (i.e., a e ). Upon receiving a p i , the BS extracts i and a e from p and computes an average energy threshold (i.e., E) by using the following equation.
where N represents the total number of MSNs in the WMSN. An a i having energy equal or greater than E is considered eligible to be elected as a CH. An exception may occur at the start of each simulation round when all MSNs have almost the same energy levels. In this case, the election of a CH is based on minor differences in energy values and can go up to four decimal digits. In upcoming simulation rounds, it is possible to have more than one nominee for a CH role. In this case, a CH is selected based on the following rules. a e should be equal to or greater than E. Node a i is not elected as a CH in past simulation rounds. In the case of same energy levels, nominees in the same geographical location are evaluated based on their previous history of the election. Once elected, the BS broadcasts a p g to the elected CHs. 
The joining process requires mutual authentication which is explained in the next section.
Mutual Authentication
After a successful advertisement, each MSN tries to become a part of a cluster lead by a CH. The aim of cluster formation is to secure data transmission from MSNs to CHs that are authorized to share data with either BS or mobile sinks. To authenticate an MSN, a payload-based handshaking mechanism is used. A 128-bit AES encryption algorithm is used to encrypt messages shared between nodes. Unlike AES-192 and AES-256 algorithms, the AES-128 algorithm requires less computational resources and is suitable for real-time data processing [21] . The MSNs exchange multiple handshake messages with CHs as shown in Fig. 3 . Once authenticated, an MSN is allowed to forward data to the nearest CH to whom it belongs.
In the session initiation phase, an MSN sends a joinrequest to the nearest CH. The join request contains j, i and i . These IDs are 8-bits long, making the join request messages extremely lightweight. A maximum of four joinrequests can be sent to a CH. After four attempts, any further attempt is simply ignored. In the join-request, an i is encapsulated in the payload while a j is encapsulated in the header. A frame check sequence is also appended as a trailer of the payload for error detection and correction.
Upon receiving the join-request, the CH retrieves j and i from the header and payload fields, respectively. If appended ID does not match with r j , the request is simply discarded otherwise the CH proceeds with the CH challenge task. The CH also searches for a matching i . If a match is found, the requesting device is considered authentic, and a challenge is forwarded back as a response. The challenge consists of an encrypted payload and is computed by Eqs. (1) and (2) .
In the MSN response phase, an MSN needs to decrypt the payload to extract m and h r . Upon successful decryption, the MSN is authenticated and able to create a challenge using Eqs. (3) and (4) to verify identity of the CH.
Upon receiving the MSN's challenge, the CH decrypts the challenge to observe an h r . If present, it retrieves an h i and creates a 256-bit encrypted payload using Eq. (5) to transmit as a response to MSN's challenge and changes the status of MSN to Authenticated.
After receiving the CH's response, the MSN verifies the identity of an r j . Upon successful verification, the mutual authentication process is completed and the MSN is now permitted to forward data to the selected CH. Furthermore, the selected CHs are now authorized to share collected data with mobile sinks. The entire mutual authentication process is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Mobile Sink Verification
In a cluster-based data communication, the CHs collect data from member nodes and forward to the BS. In our proposed SaaS, we are assuming that the Internet connection is down and the BS is unable to forward data to the cloud server. In this particular scenario, mobile sinks can collect data from the CHs and forward to the cloud server. However, use of mobile sinks raises network security issues. To ensure a secure data communication from CHs to mobile sinks, there is a need to authenticate participating mobile sinks. In the following sections, we explain registration and authentication of mobile sinks in a WMSN. 
Mobile Sink Registration
For a secure data exchange between CHs and mobile sinks, there is a need to register the mobile sinks with a BS as shown in Fig. 4 . In real-world scenarios, the mobile sinks are always on the move. As a result, the CHs get a very short amount of time to share data with authorized mobile sinks. In the proposed SaaS, each b k generates an m k and some random integers, i.e., x and z. The generated m k and random integers are used to register a b k with the BS and these numbers need to be generated before forwarding a registration request. The registration process is based on two hashing functions, i.e., H 1 and H 2 , for mapping and secure hashing purposes, respectively [22] . The first hashing function, i.e., H 1 , is used to perform a map to point hashing operation and the second hashing function, i.e., H 2 , is used to perform one-way secure hashing. For both hashing operations, the range of values is between ½0 1.
After generating random integers and m k , the first step in the registration process is to generate and send an encrypted registration request, i.e., Q k , to the BS. This registration request consists of k, m k , and one of the generated random integers, i.e., x. The registration request is generated using Eq. (6).
After receiving an encrypted registration request, the BS decrypts it and extracts all embedded values. The BS also generates two random integer values, i.e., w and y. The BS uses the extracted values to generate an encrypted challenge. The encrypted challenge consists of three different values, i.e., a registration certificate (i.e., D k ), a time-stamp (i.e., d k ), and an authentication value (i.e., C k ). The BS generates two copies of the registration certificate. One copy of registration certificate is stored at the BS for future communication and the other copy is used in the encrypted challenge. The time-stamp represents the total amount of time a mobile sink can spend in the WMSN to collect data from CHs. The authentication value is used to create a response to the encrypted challenge at the mobile sink. Three different values for the encrypted challenge are computed using Eqs. (7a), (7b), and (7c). After computing these values, the BS embeds them into an encrypted payload and sends as a challenge to the requesting b k using Eq. (7d).
After receiving the encrypted challenge, the requesting b k decrypts the payload to extract embedded values. The registration certificate and time-stamp are stored at the mobile sink, and the authentication value is used to create a response to the BS's challenge. The mobile sink uses the random integer values x and z along with the extracted authentication value and session key to create an intermediate value using Eq. (8a). The generated intermediate value along with random integer value z is encrypted in the payload of the message using Eq. (8b) and sent to the BS as a response to the challenge.
After receiving the encrypted response, the BS verifies the identity of the mobile sink using Eq. (8a). If the equation holds, the mobile sink is considered authentic otherwise it is considered an intruder node. After verifying the identity of a mobile sink, the BS performs three operations, 1) sharing of registration certificate and time-stamp of verified mobile sink with all CHs, 2) forwarding database of elected CHs to verified mobile sinks, and 3) forwarding location information of nearby CHs to verified mobile sinks to complete the registration process. b Àk " where k represents number of bs in the network b À½m, x, z g À½w, y
" g checks for the presence of 
Mobile Sink Authentication
After receiving a database of all elected CHs, a mobile sink stores it in its buffer. Second, it broadcasts a request to all nearby CHs for establishing a connection to collect data. In response, the nearby CHs reply back by sharing their unique IDs. If the IDs exist in the stored database, the mobile sink generates two intermediate values using IDs of the CHs and its own time-stamp as shown in Eqs. (9a) and (9b). These generated intermediate values are encapsulated into the payload of a connection request message as shown in Eq. (9c) and sent to the CHs. Upon receiving the connection request message, the CHs verify the identity of the mobile sink using Eq. (9a). If the equation holds, the mobile sink is considered an authentic node. Once the mobile sink is authenticated, the CHs start communication with it.
It is possible that the mobile sink is connected to more than one CH at a time. In this case, it broadcasts a data collection request to all connected CHs. The data is arranged in their buffers based on priority levels. Due to a large size, multimedia data is always of high priority and need to be transmitted first. The data collection requests provide information about the size of data. Based on the provided information, the mobile sink assigns different capacities to different CHs.
Once the mobile sink broadcasts a request for a data collection, the nearby CHs reply back with capacity allocation requests based on their low and high priority data. The mobile sink first processes high priority data requests and assigns high capacities to the requesting CHs. Once the capacity is assigned, the CHs immediately start transmitting data. If there is any capacity left at the mobile sink, it is evenly assigned to the CHs with low priority data requests. The capacity allocation process is a continuous process and stops when no more capacity is left. Furthermore, the capacities of mobile sinks are always updated due to their mobility. The current available capacity of mobile sinks at time t is estimated by using Eqs. (10) and (11) . It is possible that there are multiple mobile sinks moving around a CH. In this case, a mobile sink is selected based on the maximum available capacity. The mobile sink registration, authentication, and data exchange processes are summarized in Algorithm 2.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, first, we discuss experimental setup. Later, the performance of our proposed SaaS is evaluated in detail.
Network Setup
For simulations, we use Matlab 2017a. The network consists of 500 randomly deployed MSNs, out of which 5 percent nodes are selected as CHs. All nodes are deployed in a 500 Â 500 m 2 area. Mobile sinks and MSNs communicate over an IEEE 802.11 network. The communication range of an MSN is set to 100 m. The mobile sinks are always on the move with a speed of v using a random way-point mobility model [23] . We do not consider any pause time in their movements.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed SaaS against two similar state-of-the-art schemes, i.e., Secured Query Processing Scheme (SQPS) [24] and Modified Secured Query Processing Scheme (MSQPS) [25] . Both these schemes use a cluster-based hierarchical approach for securing the exchange of data. First, we compare the proposed SaaS against the SQPS and MSQPS in terms of various security primitives followed by their robustness against various attacks, handshake duration, authentication rate, data freshness, and packet delivery ratio, respectively.
In the proposed SaaS, the node authentication phase is a two-step process. First, the CHs are elected by the BS. Later, a mutual handshaking mechanism is performed to authenticate both the CHs and MSNs for data collection. The proposed SaaS uses a Message Authentication Code (MAC) in a Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode to ensure authentication as shown in Table 3 . The SQPS and MSQPS, on the other hand, use a simple MAC for authentication. To ensure confidentiality, the proposed SaaS uses a payload-based symmetric encryption which is extremely lightweight. In comparison, the SQPS and MSQPS employ an RC5-based symmetric cryptography to maintain the confidentiality. For data freshness, the proposed SaaS uses pseudo-random nonces (i.e., h i and h r ). These nonces have a one-time usage during the handshake mechanism and are non-reproducible. This feature ensures that redundant packets are not replayed by malicious nodes and the freshness of genuine data packets remain intact. The SQPS and MSQPS use Query Response (QR) packets to ensure the freshness of data. In this case, each member node of a cluster transmits a 4-tuple packet to its respective CH. Each QR packet ensures the freshness at the expense of a high computational load at the CHs.
We evaluate the resilience of the three schemes against various malicious attacks as shown in Table 4 . In the proposed SaaS, the presence of h i , h r and i , protects an underlying network from different types of malicious attacks. Random combinations of h i and h j in the proposed SaaS make it extremely difficult for an adversary to replay packets. The SQPS and MSQPS use QR packets to prevent the replay of malicious packets. In the proposed SaaS, use of i restricts any unauthorized node from establishing connections with the CHs. As a result, it is extremely difficult for malicious nodes to launch resource exhaustion and DoS attacks. As i is a hard-coded secret, any attempt for tempering can easily be identified and an alarm can be triggered. This feature of i ensures that a malicious node does not clone itself by stealing identities of legitimate nodes. The BS has prior knowledge about identities of all legitimate nodes which prevents the malicious nodes from launching the Sybil attacks as they are unable to impersonate themselves. The SQPS and MSQPS, on the other hand, are unable to detect resource exhaustion, DoS, cloning and Sybil attacks.
The performance of our proposed SaaS is evaluated against the SQPS and MSQPS in terms of handshake duration for various cluster sizes as shown in Table 5 . The handshake duration depends on the total number of member nodes in a cluster and is usually measured in milliseconds (ms). The handshake approach of our proposed SaaS takes less time as compared to the SQPS and MSQPS. Unlike these approaches, the CHs in our proposed SaaS use local knowledge of neighboring nodes for handshaking and authentication purposes. As the table shows, increasing the size of a cluster has a relatively small impact on the handshake duration in the proposed SaaS. However, the handshake duration increases significantly in the case of the SQPS and MSQPS with an increase in the cluster size. This is mainly due to the fact that these schemes use complex symmetric encryption suites that require excessive processing at each CH.
In Fig. 5 , an authentication rate for received messages is shown. As the figure shows, the authentication rate decreases with an increase in the number of malicious nodes in an underlying network. This is mainly because the CHs have to process requests from multiple sensor nodes (MSNs in the case of our proposed SaaS) at a given time, which allows one or more malicious nodes to sneak through the underlying authentication mechanism. Another reason for this decrease in the authentication rate is as the number of malicious nodes increases, the number of attempts by these nodes to transmit their unauthenticated information increases. In Fig. 5a , we compare our proposed SaaS against the MSQPS and SQPS in the presence of 25 malicious nodes. Although our proposed SaaS drops slightly in the first 10 seconds, it sustains itself by ensuring a higher authentication rate. The minimum authentication rate is 98.5 percent which shows that our proposed SaaS is highly robust against detection of malicious nodes. In comparison, as the time passes, the authentication rates of MSQPS and SQPS drop to 96.28 and 93.85 percent, respectively. In the presence of 50 malicious nodes, our proposed SaaS shows a minimum authentication rate of 93.1 percent as shown in Fig. 5b . In comparison, the authentication rates of MSQPS and SQPS drop to 87.8 and 81.2 percent, respectively. Fig. 5 concludes that our proposed SaaS is highly efficient in ensuring message integrity in comparison to the MSQPS and SQPS because the authentication rate is an indicator of message integrity. In Fig. 6 , the proposed SaaS is compared with the MSQPS and SQPS in terms of data freshness. A higher percentage of data freshness means a scheme is more resilient against replay attacks. In the presence of 25 malicious nodes, the average data freshness of proposed SaaS is 99.45 percent, MSQPS is 97.28 percent, and SQPS is 91.8 percent, respectively, over a period of 120 seconds. These results are depicted in Fig. 6a . The proposed SaaS achieves a higher percentage of data freshness and sustains itself against the replay attacks over the course of time. Unlike the proposed SaaS, the MSQPS experiences a significant decrease after 30 seconds of network deployment. The SQPS, on the other hand, experiences a significant drop of 11 percent in data freshness after the initial 20 seconds of network deployment. In Fig. 6b , all three schemes are compared in terms of data freshness in the presence of 50 malicious nodes. The average data freshness of the proposed SaaS is 99.3 percent, MSQPS is 94.9 percent, and SQPS is 90.3 percent, respectively, over the course of time. In the beginning, the proposed SaaS drops briefly beyond the MSQPS, however, the drop is only 1.1 percent for a short period of 10 seconds. After 30 seconds, the MSQPS and SQPS drop to as low as 91 and 15 percent, respectively, and stay low over the specified period of time. Fig. 6 concludes that as the total number of malicious nodes increases, the freshness percentage of received data decreases. An increase in the number of malicious nodes increases the number of attempts made by such nodes to transmit their data packets. As a result, redundant data packets are transmitted which affect the freshness metric and at the same time, increase the replay attacks.
In Fig. 7 , a packet delivery ratio is shown for varying number of malicious nodes. The average packet delivery ratio for proposed SaaS is 95 percent, MSQPS is 84 percent, and SQPS is 74 percent, respectively. Unlike proposed SaaS, MSQPS and SQPS experience a significant drop in the packet delivery ratio with an increase in the number of malicious nodes. This parameter is associated with the authentication rate, in general. During the authentication, the malicious nodes that go undetected, acquire time division multiple access slots from CHs and broadcast their fake data packets. Both MSQPS and SPQS experience a significant drop in the packet delivery ratio as the number of malicious nodes increases from 20 to 100, respectively.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a secure data collection scheme, called SaaS. It has been designed to collect multimedia data using mobile sinks in a wireless multimedia sensor network. The proposed SaaS is based on a clustering concept. A mutual handshaking mechanism is applied to authenticate both MSNs and CHs. Once authenticated, the MSNs forward captured data to elected CHs, and then it is the responsibility of CHs to share the collected data with nearby verified mobile sinks. The mobile sink verification involves their registration with the base station and authentication with the CHs. The simulation results have shown that our proposed SaaS performs better in terms of resilience, handshake duration, authentication rate, data freshness, and packet delivery ratio when compared with other established state-of-the-art approaches. Regarding future work, we shall use the simulation results produced in this paper as a base to perform further enhancements in our proposed SaaS to support mobile MSNs and sinks with random speeds. Besides, we aim to implement the proposed SaaS on real testbeds in open field environments to measure various phenomena of interests in order to analyze various QoS metrics. Jinjun Chen received the PhD degree in Computer Science and Software Engineering from the Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia, in 2007. He is a professor from Faculty of Science, Engineering and IT, Swinburne University of Technology, Australia. His research interests include cloud computing, big data, and data intensive systems. He has published more than 130 papers in high quality journals and conferences. He is a senior member of the IEEE.
